According to Robert J. Thomas (1994),
author of What Machines Can’t do: Politics and Technology, establishes a
fitting examination of the preeminent outlook on organizations and technology,
which makes way for Thomas’ proposed “power-process” theory (P.10). What is a
particular concern for Thomas is that prior research, most importantly, has
dropped the ball when considering the dynamic systematic series of actions
coupled with technological change. In the words of Thomas (1994) previous
researchers “…[u]nderestimate differences in the logics that underlie technical
and social systems, and that either over simplify or ignore altogether the
mediating influence of organizational choice” (P.10).
From
my understanding of this text, Thomas’ power-process model is designed to
surpass the aforementioned limitations; viewing technological change as
designed in a dichotomous process—one of which comprises of both elite and
nonelite actors to collaborate and bring their differing views together in the
decision processes involving new machines. This vividly calls to mind
philosopher of science Karl Popper (1970), author of Normal Science and Its
Dangers, where he asserts that “…[a]t any moment we are prisoners caught in
the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our
languages. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try, we can break
out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in
a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; we can at any moment
break out of it again” (P.56).
I
believe Popper would argue that scientists should have a community where they
are free to check and criticize each other. Correspondingly, I would argue that
Thomas would encourage managers to not adopt an imperceptive approach to
smarter machines, but to seek out new opportunities for people to
collaborate. In the era of global interconnectedness, knowledge sharing and
global competition, the way managers organize work is imperative for its
survival. In addition, what I found particularly interesting is Thomas’
accounts of technological change in branches of aircraft and the auto industry.
In this case, Thomas’ unit of analysis is not the industry in itself, but
distinct examples of technological change. Thomas’ ascertains the
decision-making process from its previous period within the organization, to
the actual point of identifying organizational complications to deciding what
technologies will benefit the organization to the point of bona fide
implementation of these technologies.
Equally
important is the focus on class divisions, which seems to remain unable to be
seen when examined through the lens of the worker. For Thomas there exists
organizational strain between product design engineers and manufacturing or
process engineers. Thomas argues that “…[t]he subordination of process design
left managers and engineers in manufacturing without a strategy to guide their
choices other than what they could infer from careful scrutiny of new product
developments” (P.217). Aside from organization strain and the politics in
correlation with technology; I believe that at times the power-process model
gives the impression that it is not necessarily distinguished as a theory, but
as an assortment of beliefs, which throughout the reading the precise outcome
is somewhat ambiguous. Together with the focal point to approach organizational
processes from a linear perspective; as to draw attention to the organizational
sphere of influence and political impact is also somewhat obscure.
Nevertheless, outside these preceding observations, I appreciate Thomas’
meticulous research to bring to light elements of organizational life worth
considering; bringing about more of a focus on technology, labor and
organizational change, which is of primary importance.
Resources:
Popper, Karl. (1970). Normal Science & Its
Dangers. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
(eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
Cambridge University Press. P. 56.
Thomas, Robert J. (1994). What
Machines Can't Do: Politics & Technology in the Industrial
Enterprise.
University of California Press. P. 10-217.
About the Author:
Christopher Tillman Neal is a detail-oriented IT professional with 7+ years of experience. He is driven by the sociology of computer-mediated communication—skilled at operating in a wide range of platforms. Graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, Christopher has a diverse career portfolio, which consists of social media analytics, information technology, sales, marketing, and project management. Christopher received rigorous virtual community and social media training from Berkeley, and Stanford Professor Howard Rheingold who is one of the world’s foremost authorities on the social implications of technology.
If you have any questions, please email chris-neal@alumni.ls.berkeley.edu
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