Social Psychology in the Workplace

Monday, September 30, 2013

Sociotechnical Systems: Technology, Labor & Organizational Change by Christopher Tillman Neal c.2012

According to Robert J. Thomas (1994), author of What Machines Can’t do: Politics and Technology, establishes a fitting examination of the preeminent outlook on organizations and technology, which makes way for Thomas’ proposed “power-process” theory (P.10). What is a particular concern for Thomas is that prior research, most importantly, has dropped the ball when considering the dynamic systematic series of actions coupled with technological change. In the words of Thomas (1994) previous researchers “…[u]nderestimate differences in the logics that underlie technical and social systems, and that either over simplify or ignore altogether the mediating influence of organizational choice” (P.10).

From my understanding of this text, Thomas’ power-process model is designed to surpass the aforementioned limitations; viewing technological change as designed in a dichotomous process—one of which comprises of both elite and nonelite actors to collaborate and bring their differing views together in the decision processes involving new machines. This vividly calls to mind philosopher of science Karl Popper (1970), author of Normal Science and Its Dangers, where he asserts that “…[a]t any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our languages. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; we can at any moment break out of it again” (P.56).

I believe Popper would argue that scientists should have a community where they are free to check and criticize each other. Correspondingly, I would argue that Thomas would encourage managers to not adopt an imperceptive approach to smarter machines, but to seek out new opportunities for people to collaborate. In the era of global interconnectedness, knowledge sharing and global competition, the way managers organize work is imperative for its survival. In addition, what I found particularly interesting is Thomas’ accounts of technological change in branches of aircraft and the auto industry. In this case, Thomas’ unit of analysis is not the industry in itself, but distinct examples of technological change. Thomas’ ascertains the decision-making process from its previous period within the organization, to the actual point of identifying organizational complications to deciding what technologies will benefit the organization to the point of bona fide implementation of these technologies.

Equally important is the focus on class divisions, which seems to remain unable to be seen when examined through the lens of the worker. For Thomas there exists organizational strain between product design engineers and manufacturing or process engineers. Thomas argues that “…[t]he subordination of process design left managers and engineers in manufacturing without a strategy to guide their choices other than what they could infer from careful scrutiny of new product developments” (P.217). Aside from organization strain and the politics in correlation with technology; I believe that at times the power-process model gives the impression that it is not necessarily distinguished as a theory, but as an assortment of beliefs, which throughout the reading the precise outcome is somewhat ambiguous. Together with the focal point to approach organizational processes from a linear perspective; as to draw attention to the organizational sphere of influence and political impact is also somewhat obscure. Nevertheless, outside these preceding observations, I appreciate Thomas’ meticulous research to bring to light elements of organizational life worth considering; bringing about more of a focus on technology, labor and organizational change, which is of primary importance.

Resources:

Popper, Karl. (1970). Normal Science & Its Dangers. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave

(eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. P. 56.

Thomas, Robert J. (1994). What Machines Can't Do: Politics & Technology in the Industrial

Enterprise. University of California Press. P. 10-217.

About the Author:

Christopher Tillman Neal is a detail-oriented IT professional with 7+ years of experience. He is driven by the sociology of computer-mediated communication—skilled at operating in a wide range of platforms. Graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, Christopher has a diverse career portfolio, which consists of social media analytics, information technology, sales, marketing, and project management. Christopher received rigorous virtual community and social media training from Berkeley, and Stanford Professor Howard Rheingold who is one of the world’s foremost authorities on the social implications of technology.

If you have any questions, please email chris-neal@alumni.ls.berkeley.edu

Learn more at Berkeley profile https://cal.berkeley.edu/christopher Peeragogy.org http://goo.gl/O03Rp Howard Rheingold credits http://rheingold.com/credits/ Net Smart acknowledgments http://goo.gl/aigdD Peeragogy Handbook mention http://goo.gl/9lPYy Google + http://goo.gl/AMBbA or follow me on Twitter (@CNealUCB) and LinkedIn http://goo.gl/lyPFA. Go to link http://goo.gl/Aj9Fg to view online curriculum vitae.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

"The Organization of Technology Production: Thoughts and Reflections" by Christopher Tillman Neal

Annalee Saxenian (1996) author of Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 argues: “[T] he industrial structure of Route 128 was defined by the search for corporate self-sufficiency or autarky” (p.69). Autarky is defined as the quality of being self-sufficient, so the way I was able to understand her argument is that Route 128’s “Puritan Industry” was governed by big, hierarchical, centralized organizations, whose labor pool remained stable. They rarely communicated with one another and creative as well as innovative approaches to business was amassed within the company (p.60). This type of structure was the exact opposite of the Silicon Valley pattern. Silicon Valley’s firm’s were small and ambitious. Saxenian (1996) attests that “…[t] his decentralized and fluid environment accelerated the diffusion of technological capabilities and know-how within the region” (p.37).

While I find the preceding work interesting, I was looking for more of an economic analysis because I believe this reading was created to persuade the reader into thinking about economic policy, in respect to a volatile information technology industry. Equally important, was the seemingly unclear explanation of how the two regions, Route 128 and the Silicon Valley, are explained in a scheme related to manufacturing and technological history. Nevertheless, James Baron and Michael Hannon (2002) authors of Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Projection Emerging Companies argue that ‘“…[t] echnology companies apparently pay a significant and enduring price for having altered the HR blueprint at an earlier point in time. On balance, “staying the course” seems to be a winning HR strategy for technology startups, particularly for firms founded along commitment model lines”’ (p.27).

Furthermore, what I found interesting was Baron and Hannon’s (2002) employee relation model analysis, where this bureaucratic and autocratic model, one in which employees are managed by formal controls lead to a considerable failure, and low growth rates in market capitalization’s. However, the “star” model, which recruits, rewards and supports employees based on their talent—supports start-up success. On the other hand, Baron and Hannon (2002) contend that when a company begins to scale up—bureaucratic an autocratic models works best, but makes this transition from a star or commitment model very difficult, and even disastrous. Thus, Baron and Hannon indicated that it is vital to discern carefully, regarding employee blueprints, from the beginning. I just wonder how the notion of gender will play out in a bureaucratic and autocratic model? Will this model affect gender equality in the workplace, which is an ongoing debate? In my opinion, decentralizing decision-making, reducing rules, and flattening hierarchy should be considered carefully at the beginning. This strategy can create a shield of benefit, for organizational members who are women, from informal male-dominated networks, and thus level the organizational playing field.

Resources:

Baron, James et. al. (2002). Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Projection Emerging Companies. California Management Review, Vol. 44, P. 27, Spring.

Saxenian, Annalee. (1996). Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. Harvard University paperback edition. P. 37-69.

About the author:

If you have any questions, please email chris-neal@alumni.ls.berkeley.edu

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Cognitive Dissonance: Why Social Business Change Is Hard by Matt Ridings

Cognitive Dissonance is that discomfort we feel when we try and hold two conflicting thoughts in the mind at the same time. If we believe we are inherently a good person, then when we do something bad we feel dissonance. The disappointment we feel when someone acts differently from the view in which we held them is also a form of dissonance. From an organizational perspective, if you've been entrenched in a long held process or corporate culture the implication is that it was the *right* process (whether you agreed with that or not). So when someone comes along and turns over that apple cart and says there is a *new* right way, dissonance is created.

When you try and institute change within an organization, you are going to encounter this. What's critical to understand is that this is not only 'normal' behavior, but to some degree inevitable. It's just the way our brains work. The larger the organization, and the greater the change, the more this dissonance (and thus resistance) will occur.
So what? Why all the psychological mumbo jumbo? Because change management is so utterly critical to deploying the cultural sea change necessary for the next generation of Social Business. I see so many consultants in this space banging their head on the wall out of frustration that big companies just don't 'get it'. They sit at lunch with me and argue about how 'stupid' these executives are because they've presented them with irrefutable logic about the 'best' way to run an organization and the executive still doesn't bite.

Logic and reason, unfortunately, have little to do with making change actually happen. You are still creating dissonance. You will still be resisted at every turn if you don't have a solid change management plan in place that takes into account the incredibly nuanced aspects of politics, culture shift, systems and process, etc. You cannot just 'roll out' a decision that requires any significant change within an organization and expect a high degree of success. Saying:

"We have new software, systems, and processes. We are going to train you. We will now be a 'social' company starting on Friday of next week"

is akin to saying

"I just bought you a wine cellar, filled it with wine, and gave you a book...you start your new job as a sommelier on Friday".

There is also no such thing as a unilateral change management plan. We talk about corporate culture like it's a single 'thing', but it's really not. From department to department, geographic location to location, the cultures are different. Sure, they all combine to some generic sense of the type of culture a company has but that's not good enough for effective change management. Some regions/groups respond best to well defined messaging based on self-interest, others on shared interest (sometimes corporate shared interest, other times societal shared interest). In some regions the dictatorial style may actually work if messaged properly (France and Belgium for example). The point is that simply knowing the 'right' thing to do for a company is not enough. Simply saying "you must now do this" is not enough.
At a simplistic level you can look at it through the lens of one of the tools I use in my workshops called "What? So What? What Now?"*

1. What? - What are we trying to accomplish big picture?
2. So What? - Why are we trying to accomplish it? What are the implications of doing so? What are the
implications of not accomplishing it? What does it mean to *me*? What does it mean to the familial group
(department/division)? What does it mean to the corporation? What does it mean to the consumer?
3. What Now? - Visualize the before and after. What actions do we take to start down this path?

*Note - Items 2 & 3 are done in layers to accommodate messaging specific and relative to the audience, there's not just one.

So to my consultant friends who are so frustrated right now...knowing what someone should do, no matter how correct, is not a substitute for knowing how to get them there. It's not that those executives are necessarily disagreeing with your assessment, they simply don't believe that you understand how to truly make it happen. Show them they're wrong, demonstrate your understanding of complex change management and you may find your success rate goes up.
Best of luck.

Cheers,

Matt Ridings - @techguerilla

About: Matt RidingsFounder of MSR Consulting, a referral only firm focused on delivering tangible results to its clients via Managed Services and Relationship Marketing with specializations in the areas of Social Media, eCommerce, and Healthcare.